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Important Cases Decided by the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky During the Month of March, 1914.
OSBORNE'S ADMINISTRATOR VS. CINCINNATI, NEW
ORLEANS AND TEXAS PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.
This case was appealed from the Pulaski Circuit Court and decided
March 24th, 1914. In the case a construtction of the Federal statute
known as the Employers Liability Act was brought before the court.
The plaintiff's decedent was killed while not in the discharge of
duty as an employe but was answering a call to report for duty and begin
his work. He was a regular employe, and at intervals was not actually
engaged in work, but his time belonged to the company and subject to its
orders.
The court in determining as to whether or not he must be at actual
labor in order to recover or whether he might recover while in the
employe and in the act of reporting for labor lays down the following
rules for construing said statute in this state.
Under the Federal Hours of Service Act, an employe is not engaged
in service within the meaning of the Act unless he is actually engaged in
or connected with the movement of a train. And so a brakeman is not
engaged in service when he is on his way from his home to his work,
although he left his home in obedience to an order of the company
directing him to report for service connected with the movement of the
train.
A brakeman who is "dead-heading" from one point to another on
the road under direction of the company so that he may be able to report
for duty at the place to which he is going, is not, while so "dead-heading"
engaged in service within the meaning of the Act, when he has no duties
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL.
to perform in connection with the movement of the train on which he
is "dead-heading."
When an employe, in obedience to a rule of the company, reports
for train service a half hour before the time fixed for the departure of
the train, this time is to be counted in computing the hours of service if
he is ordered to report so that he may perform some service in connec-
tion with preparing the train for its departure.
When it is sought to recover damages for negligence or wrongful
acts, there must be some evidence to show that the injury complained of
was caused by the negligence of the defendant, and this evidence must
be sufficient to charge the defendant with a breach of duty. A recovery
cannot be had on mere surmises or speculations as to how the injury
happened, nor will it be presumed that the defendant was guilty of
actionable negligence.
Mere proof of the injury, with attending circumstances, is not
sufficient. There must be some evidence conducing to show that the
injury was caused by the negligence of the defendant. When the plain-
tiff merely presents theories as to how the accident happened or specula-
tive reasons that caused it, no recovery can be had.
LUCAS VS. HAGEDORN, ET AL.
This case was appealed from the Fayette Circuit Court, and decided
March 27th, 1914. This case involves the construction of section 2127
of the Kentucky Statutes, which provides against a wife signing as
surety for her husband.
Frequently money is borrowed and to avoid the binding force
of that statute the woman is caused to sign as principal so as to bind her
and then the husband signs as surety. But when a case presents such
facts, that the wife is in reality the surety for the husband, although
signed as principal recovery from her cannot be had, and no property
that she has can be subjected to the payment of such a debt. The opinion
lays down the following as the law of this state upon that subject.
In determining whether a married woman is principal or surety on
a note, the courts will scrutinize the entire transaction, and regard the
substance and not the form, and if it appear that the form of the trans-
action was a mere device or subterfuge to evade the statute, and that the
wife was a mere surety in fact, she will not be held liable.
In an action to recover on two notes executed by two married
women as consideration for a business which by certain contracts was
sold and transferred to them, evidence examined, and held that H., the
brother-in-law of one and husband of the other, was the real purchaser,
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and that plaintiff knew this fact, and that the contracts were simply a
device to evade section 2127, Kentucky Statutes, providing that no part
of a married woman's estate shall be subjected to the payment or satis-
faction of any liability, upon a contract made after marriage, to answer
for the debt, default or misdoing of another, including her husband,
unless such estate shall have been set apart for that purpose by deed of
mortgage or other conveyance.
KENTUCKY MILITARY INSTITUTE VS. BRAMBLET.
This case was appealed from the Jefferson Circuit Court, and raises
the question as to whether or not the said Military Institute can collect
the whole amount required to maintain a student in that institution for
one year, when the student has matriculated and after having spent but
a short time in the school was expelled for hazing. Two hundred dollars
was paid down when the student entered, and the institution sought not
only to retain the $200 but to collect the remaining amount due for the
whole year. The terms were advertised in the circulars issued by the
institution in accordance with the claim made by it. The court in
deciding the case holds as follows:
In an action by a father to recover tuition paid for his son following
the son's expulsion from school after having been found guilty of hazing,
the counterclaim for the unpaid tuition for the scholastic year was
properly disallowed, but the father having entered the boy for the school
term, paying in advance $200 he obligated himself for so much of that
term as that sum would pay, and the boy by his conduct having forfeited
his right to remain in school, thereby depriving the school from carrying
out its contract, the father is not entitled to recover any portion of the
amount paid.
The conduct of the student in being guilty of hazing was in viola-
tion of the published rules with which he was familiar, and was of such
a character as to warrant expulsion.
It was error to submit to the jury the question as to whether the
regulation with reference to hazing was just or reasonable, or the abstract
question as to whether there was just or reasonable cause for the dis-
missal. The court being of the opinion that the rule was reasonable, it
became the province of the jury to try the question as to the boy's guilt
and as to this there was no question for the facts were admitted.
RUSSELL VS. W. E. CALDWELL COMPANY.
This case was uppealed' from the Jefferson Circuit Court, and was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals fixing the law as to how far an employee
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assumes the risk so as to exempt his employer from responsibility -in
doing certain kinds of work.
The employee was sent to do repairing on a roof and while working
he fell and was injured. -And in his suit against his employer his case
was dismissed in the lower court and on appeal the case was affirmed
and the law laid down as follows:
One employed to do repair work on a roof and the guttering thereof,
knows in advance that his employer is not undertaking to furnish him a
reasonably safe place to work, because the place being out of repair is
necessarily in some measure dangerous, and the employee necessarily
assumes the additional risk growing out of the then condition of the
place.
The allegation that he was only employed to repair certain places
in the roof or guttering, and was not employed to repair the particular
guttering or appliance which gave way with him and caused him to fall,
cannot relieve the employee from the assumption of the added risk. The
fact that some parts of the roof and guttering were out of repair was
notice to him that it was all more or less dangerous.
HOUSTON, STANWOOD AND GAMBLE CO., vs. BAIN.
This case was appealed from the Kenton Circuit Court and presents
these factr:
John F. Bain brought this suit against the company to recover
for a personal .injury which he alleged he received while in its employ
as a boiler maker, by reason of its negligence in furnishing him an
unsafe tool to work with. He was engaged in beading the tubes in a
boiler and in doing this used a beading tool operated by compressed
air. It appears that this tool was given him to work with by the fore-
man Evans, and it was 2 1-2 inches long and had a flaw or crack in it.
Bain told Evans that it was unsafe, Evans responded by saying to him
to go ahead anyhow and he would get him a better tool; that he was
in a hurry for the work, and that the boiler had to go out. While
working with the tool a short time after this during the same morning,
it is alleged by reason of the defectiveness of the tool Bain's index
finger of the right hand was caught between the air gun and the boiler
and was injured so that the finger is now crooked and he is without
power to straighten it. Bain in the lower court was given judgment for
$342.00. "
On appealing the court affirms the judgment of the Lower Court
and fixes this as law of the case; a servant who continues at work on a
hurried job upon an order of the master who promises to give him bet-
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ter tools, may recover for an injury received by reason of the defective
tool if the danger was not so imminent that a person of ordinary
3rudence would not have continued at work; this is the question always
for the jury ordinarily acting to determine from the facts.
ROHRMAN, ETC., vs. BONSER.
This case was appealed from the Jefferson Circuit Court and raises
the question of how far the misrepresentation in securing the name
of a surety upon a note, may be used by the surety as defense when suit
is brought upon the note.
The facts in this case show that the note was presented to the
individual member of the corporation and he was asked to sign the
note as security to secure the payment of a debt due by the company
and it was represented to be past due, although it had not yet matured.
Another question by way of defense was raised by alleging that when
the note was presented for the signature of the surety, the note holder
atated he would get another to go on the note with the surety, but
never did so, .and in determining how far responsibility was assumed
by the surety by reason of these facts the court lays down this law.
A representation by one holding a claim against a corporation,
that the claim was long past due when in fact it was not, to induce
the officers or stock holders in the corporation to become bound as
sureties of the claim, can not operate to relieve those signing as such
sureties.
An agreement by the holder of a note when delivered to him by
the surety, that he would procure the signature of another to the
instrument does not impair the obligatory force of the note nor bar
the holder's right to recover thereon, yet where the surety by way of
counter-claim asserts as against the holder damages by reason of his
failure to comply with his agreement makes a counter-claim for such
damages which may be used against the collection of the note.
LOVE vs. McCANDLESS, ETD.
In this case, which was appealed from the Metcalfe Circuit Court,
the question of what amounts to an abandonement of a homestead under
Section 1707 of the Kentucky Statutes is raised, but that feature
.of the decision establishes no particular new law, as it seems to be
well settled in this state that when a homestead is allotted to a widow
she can use it without interruption during her life unless she volun-
tarily abandons it. It seems to be well settled that it is not necessary
for her to Teside upon the homestead but that she may have it used
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and occupied by a tenant, and as long as it is clear that she is not
intentionally abandoning it she has the right to retain all the rights
and privileges connected therewith.
The question in this case is whether or not an infant widow by
reason of certain acts abandons her homestead so as to lose it. In
summing up the law and repeating some of the old well established
law the court lays down this rule.
Under Section 1707 of the Kentucky Statutes a widow is only
entitled to a homestead as long as she occupies the same by herself
or a tenant or she may forfeit the homestead right by selling -it or by
abandoning it.
The mere abandonment by an infant widow of the occupancy of
a homestead either by herself or a tenant does not operate to deny her
the right on or before arriving of age to assert her right to a home-
stead although she may have fully abandoned same.
The abandonment by a widow of her homestead may be shown by
her acts and conduct independent of any writing. The fact of her
abandonment may be shown by parol evidence. Where an infant widow
is entitled to a homestead, removed to another state and when she
comes of age by the laws of the state to which she moves, although
under 21 years of age (the period at which she becomes of age in this
state), sold her homestead rights, this act in connection with the fact
that she had never occupied the premises of the homestead, worked an
abandonment of it, and after she became 21 years of age she could
not assert her right to the homestead.
CLIPPINGS.
FULL PANEL.
The jurors filed into the jury box, and after all the twelve seats
were filled.there still remained one juror standing outside.
"If the Court please," said the Clerk, "they have made a mistake and
sent us thirteen jurors instead of twelve. What do you Want to do with
this extra one?"
"What is your name ?" asked the Judge of the extra man.
"Joseph A. Braines," he replied.
"Mr. Clerk," said the Judge, "take this man back to the jury com-
missioners and tell them we don't need him as we already have here
twelve men without Braines."--The Green Bag.
